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Assessing Vulnerability of Selected Sectors  
Under Environmental Tax Reform: 
 
The Issue of Pricing Power 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper describes an analysis of price-setting behaviour by six energy intensive 
sectors in six EU countries. The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the relative 
strengths of world prices and domestic costs in determining the sectors’ output prices, 
with a view to assessing pricing constraints facing the sectors.  
 
The aim underlying this study is to throw light on how a sector would fare under the 
introduction of carbon or energy taxes. Such taxes raise domestic costs and the 
question is to what extent can the sector pass these on by virtue of its being a price-
setter; alternatively is the sector a price-taker meaning that, if it failed to absorb the 
cost increase, it would be vulnerable to competitive disadvantage under such tax 
reforms?  
 
The study forms part of a larger project, called COMETR (Competitiveness Effects of 
Environmental Tax Reform, a Specific Targeted Research Project supported by the 
EU’s Sixth Framework Programme for Research and coordinated by the National 
Environmental Research Institute in Denmark). To date measures of vulnerability and 
threats to competitiveness have availed of a number of features such as energy share, 
trade exposure, share of the market, market power, and to some extent on potential for 
technological efficiency. Other investigations in this field include Fagerberg (1988), 
Shroeter et al., (1988), Durand et al. (1992), Turner and Van’t Dack (1993), 
Fagerberg (1996), Barker and Köhler (1998), Wolfram (1999), Williams et al. (2002), 
European Commission (2004), ZhongXiang (2004). The purpose of this study is to 
extend our understanding of vulnerability by looking at the recent pricing behaviour 
to see how constrained is a sector’s pricing. 
 
Concern is expressed that carbon taxes would harm traded energy intensive sectors by 
causing their prices to rise out of line with those of competitors in foreign and 
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domestic markets. It is feared that these sectors might cease production or relocate to 
jurisdictions with lower environmental taxes, or laxer regulations - dubbed pollution 
havens. Relocation could therefore result in carbon emissions moving elsewhere with 
little or no environmental improvement in global terms, merely carbon leakage. A 
sector with pricing power however is not constrained when costs rise and there is less 
reason to fear that they would cease or relocate.  
 
In the next section, after briefly describing the context for this study, six potentially 
vulnerable sectors are selected for analysis of their pricing power. The paper proceeds 
to summarise the literature on price setting and formulates a model of price setting 
behaviour. The data used and the results of applying the model are then described. 
After a discussion of results by sector, some implications are outlined, followed by a 
concluding section. 
 
2. Context 
The context is the series of environmental tax reforms that were implemented in a 
number of EU countries, mostly during the period of the nineties. These tax reforms 
were the subject of the COMETR project, an ex post study of their effects on 
competitiveness. The reforms in question were the carbon or energy taxes introduced 
alongside revenue recycling, mainly in the form of reduced labour taxes.  Six EU 
countries introduced such environmental tax reforms (ETRs) as follows: 
 
(Table 1) 
 
Other modules of the COMETR study have investigated the effects of ETR on 
greenhouse gas emissions, GDP and prices, and on uptake of new technology 
(COMETR, 2007). 
 
Given the focus on competitiveness, the sectors deemed potentially most vulnerable 
and selected for study were those that, in addition to being characterised by high 
energy intensity, were subject to trade exposure as measured by export and import 
intensity. Sectors were ranked according to, among other things, energy expenditure 
as a share of gross value added, the share of exports in the total value of output, and 
imports as a share of home demand (output plus imports minus exports). Knowledge 
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of specific country characteristics was brought to bear on the selection in order to 
obtain a balanced representation of sectors, taking into account such issues as the 
prominence of wood and wood products in the Swedish and Finnish economies. The 
seven selected sectors were as follows:  
(Table 2) 
  
An idea of the vulnerability of these sectors under the introduction of an energy or 
carbon tax can be gauged by their unit energy costs. Expenditure on energy inputs 
expressed as a percentage of sectoral gross value added at basic prices is shown in 
Table 3. 
 
It is seen that, in addition to considerable variation in energy unit costs between 
sectors as expected, there is considerable variation between countries within sectors at 
this level of detail. Turning to trade exposure, this is described in Tables 4 and 5 for 
exports and imports respectively. For reasons that will become clear, it is the share of 
trade with EU countries shown here that is of special interest.  
(Table 4) 
(Table 5) 
 
As shown, the majority of imports were sourced from the EU, and a majority of 
exports were destined for the EU. At the lower end of trade shares with the EU was 
the sector Non-metallic mineral products (of which cement forms a large share), 
though, like Food beverages and tobacco, this sector tended to trade a relatively low 
share of its output in any event. 
 
3. Literature Review and Price-Setting Model  
Where firms operate in a perfectly competitive market they are price takers on that 
market and the price equals the marginal cost of production. However, in many cases 
firms may operate under imperfect competition having a degree of market power. In 
this latter case firms may be expected to set their prices as a mark-up on cost, with the 
mark-up on cost reflecting the shape of the demand curve that they face. Where firms 
have market power and are able to discriminate between markets, producers will 
maximise profits by charging different prices in each market. This is the basis of a 
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measure that is frequently used, the Lerner Index, where the difference between price 
and marginal cost (as a proportion of price) measures the relative monopoly price 
distortion, as illustrated for example in Schroeter (1988) and Wolfram (1999).  
 
Price setting behaviour by firms has been the subject of intensive research in the 
literature over the past 30 years. Calmfors and Herin (1978) showed that while some 
Swedish firms exposed to international competition were price takers others were less 
dependent on world market prices. Pricing to market is a well-established 
phenomenon (Krugman, 1987) and there is evidence of its importance in explaining 
price changes in small open economies (Naug and Nymoen, 1996). Callan and Fitz 
Gerald (1989) show how Irish firms’ pricing decisions changed over the 1980s with 
the advent of the EMS and the growing importance of the EU market; increasingly 
Irish firms’ pricing decisions were determined by German producer prices (and the 
bilateral exchange rate). Friberg and Vredin (1996) show how pricing behaviour by 
Swedish firms evolved over time with a reduction in the proportion pricing in 
Swedish crowns and an increase in the proportion invoicing in foreign currencies. 
 
Thus it is an empirical question, tested in this paper, whether firms in a particular 
sector in a particular country are price takers or whether they have market power, 
setting their own prices in a manner such that they can pass on at least some of any 
changes in domestic costs. 
 
In this study the market price-setting power of the selected sectors is assessed for the 
ETR countries, namely, Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
the UK. With data being available for Ireland it is included for interest. The aim is to 
understand the global market context and establish by reference to past behaviour 
which sectors can ‘pass on’ cost increases, such as environmental taxes, or whether 
they maintain sectoral output prices at a competing foreign price level.  
 
Two polar cases of the pricing of domestic manufacturing output can be posited, 
where prices are either: 
• externally determined, and the sector is a price-taker, or  
• determined as a mark-up on domestic costs, and the sector is a price-setter. 
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In the latter case the sector is less exposed to competitive pressures and can be said to 
have market power. It is less vulnerable in the event of the introduction of the tax 
element of ETR, such as a carbon or energy tax, which it can pass on. If on the other 
hand the former case holds and prices for the sector’s product are externally 
determined, then that sector could indeed be vulnerable in the event of the 
introduction of a carbon tax, in the absence of adequate mitigating measures such as 
revenue recycling or if there are no worthwhile technological adaptations that it can 
undertake.  A mixture of the two cases is also a possibility. 
 
In specifying a price-setting model one may start with a perfectly competitive market, 
where the law of one price holds. Using  to denote the domestic price of sector i’s 
product, and p
ip
f to denote the foreign price expressed in domestic currency, then in the 
perfectly competitive situation:   
 
ip  =  pfi 
 
Meanwhile in an oligopolistic situation profit-maximising firms set prices as an 
optimal mark-up over marginal costs: 
 
iii mcp µ+=     
 
where  is the marginal cost andimc iµ is the mark-up, which can be zero. Leaving 
aside reactions to short-term events, these relationships should reflect the two sets of 
influences on the setting of output price. The following model could therefore be 
estimated:  
 
ii mcp 10 αα ++=  2α pfi 
 
One could thereby test for evidence that prices are either set domestically i.e. 
according to domestic costs, or otherwise set by the foreign price. Three outcomes are 
of interest: the coefficient 1α  on domestic costs is significant, 2α  is significant so that 
the external price matters), or a mixture of the two.  
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The equation above is taken to be a long-run price relationship. It is consistent with 
perfectly competitive markets that require goods to be perfect substitutes. It is 
plausible that for some sectors there is room for market power to hold but there is a 
limit on price divergence in the long run. This is because at sufficiently high domestic 
prices all markets are contestable such that entry can occur. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2000) show that declining transport costs can have a big impact on relative demand 
for domestic and foreign goods (thus explaining the falling ‘home trade bias puzzle’) 
and hence on relative prices  –  this could  justify a time trend but it is not used in the 
following analysis. 
 
If estimated coefficients on foreign prices are significant, the sector is likely to be a 
price taker and therefore subject to competition. If the estimated coefficients on only 
domestic costs are significant the sector is likely to be immune from competition from 
abroad. Some mixture of the two is possible.  
 
Purchasing power parity (PPP) is imposed for the long-run structural relationship 
between exchange rates and foreign prices.  
 
The basic model to be estimated then becomes: 
 
Pd* = f(Pfj , Rj , Wk )                                                                                                           
 
where Pd* = the long-run wholesale price for the sector’s domestic output in 
domestic currency terms 
 Pfj  =  the world wholesale price index in the ‘competing’ country or bloc j 
 Rj    =  the exchange rate with country or bloc j 
 Wk   =  the price index for domestic input factor k. Wage rates are used. 
 
The US being a dominant trading bloc, its price is taken as the ‘world price’ or the 
price in competing country j. In a second run the German price is used as the world or 
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competing country price. To allow for different lengths of responses to changes in 
prices and exchange rates, a lagged response is allowed for, by inclusion of an error-
correction type term. The error correction representation is:      
 
∑ ∑ +∆+∆+−+=∆ −−−− ytititttt XiyiXYY εααβλα )()()( 321111        (1)    
 
where β = parameters of the cointegrating vector, lambda λ is the speed of adjustment 
parameter where a higher value indicates a faster convergence from short-run 
dynamics to the long-run situation, and ytε = white-noise disturbance with no moving 
average part, and iα are all parameters. 
 
Equations are estimated for each sector for each country investigated.  
 
4. Data 
Data are quarterly and run mainly from 1975 to 2002/3, and were sourced from the 
OECD and Eurostat. There are two basic sources for quarterly data on sectoral output 
prices, with a sufficient time span. The OECD Statistical Compendium 2004-2 
“Indicators of Activities for Industry and Services ISIC Rev.3” (ceased end 2001) was 
used to extract producer prices (1995=100) for the countries of interest – Denmark, 
Germany, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and on the US price as the 
‘world price’. These were available as a domestic price index constructed in national 
currency. Corresponding domestic producer price indices at the sectoral level (NACE 
code) were available from EUROSTAT from 1990 onwards (reference IO7qprin). The 
OECD series was used after updating with the appropriate rate of change in the price 
from the corresponding price series up to quarter 4, 2004.   
 
The domestic manufacturing wage for the entire period is available from the OECD 
and is calculated as a quarterly index of hourly earnings (2000=100) in all 
manufacturing for each country. Sectoral specific wage rates were not available.  
Owing to the index form of the data, measures such as the Lerner Index are not 
estimated.  
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The exchange rates used were obtained from EUROSTAT (Ameco) and are 
represented as a quarterly average where one DM, US dollar or SEK is equal to so 
many units of domestic currency. Post Euro values were converted back to domestic 
currencies existing prior to the introduction of the Euro in order to achieve a 
consistent exchange rate time series.  
 
The following time series are analysed for the 30-year period Q1 1975 to Q4 2004: 
 
XXCHEMPR : domestic producer price for Chemicals (1990=1) 
XXBASMETPR : domestic producer price for Basic Metals (1990=1) 
XXFBTPR : domestic producer price for Food, Beverages and Tobacco (1990=1) 
XXNMETPR : domestic producer price for Non-metallic Mineral Products (1990=1) 
XXPAPPR : domestic producer price for Paper and Paper Products (1990=1) 
XXWOODPR : domestic producer price for Wood and Wood Products (1990=1) 
XXUSD : 1 US dollar = units of domestic currency 
XXDE : 1 German Deutschmark = units of domestic currency   
XXSW : 1 Swedish Kroner = units of domestic currency 
Where XX = DE, DK, FI, IE, NL, SW, UK, US 
 
DEMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for Germany 
DKMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for Denmark 
FIMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for Finland 
IEMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for Ireland 
NLMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for the Netherlands 
SWMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for Sweden 
UKMANW : All manufacturing manual wage index for the United Kingdom 
All of the above wage rates are in index form, 2000 = 1.000 
 
Data were not to hand for dealing with Pharmaceuticals separately from Chemicals. 
The data on Food and Drink included Tobacco. Econometric tests are described in 
Appendix 1. All econometric estimations have been carried out using Eviews 5.0 
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5. Results 
 
The basic model in (1) above was tested on the data. Table 6a shows the results and 
significance levels for the three items, λ (the speed of adjustment), domestic cost (own 
country manufacturing wage) and foreign output price in US dollars across the six 
selected sectors and six ETR countries plus Ireland. A measure of fit is given by the 
adjusted R2.  
 
Table 6b shows the equivalent analysis with the German as opposed to US price used 
to represent the foreign or competing price. 
 
At the base of each table are two rows headed ‘result’. For each sector, these give the 
number of countries for which the domestic cost and then the foreign price were 
significant determinants of price. Results are now discussed for each sector followed 
by overall implications.  
(Table 6a) 
(Table 6b) 
 
6. Discussion of Results by Sector 
 
Chemicals 
For this sector, there is a better fit generally when the German rather than the US price 
is used to represent the foreign price. The long-run relationship, as measured by λ, 
was found to be significant for most countries with a few exceptions. For Sweden the 
long-run relationship holds only when the German price is used (at 10% level), and 
for the Netherlands only when the US price is used.  
 
Turning to the actual strength of domestic versus foreign influences on the output 
price, results in Table 6a are somewhat mixed for this sector. The US price is found to 
influence chemicals output prices only in the Netherlands (quite strongly) and in 
Ireland. By contrast in Germany in particular and in Ireland too the results suggest 
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that domestic costs have a significant influence, Ireland being influenced by both the 
US price and domestic costs. 
 
In Table 6b, where the German price was used as the potential foreign price 
determinant, Sweden and the UK are found to respond to this price, having not 
responded to the US price.   Ireland responds to both foreign prices. Domestic costs 
are not significant determinants in any country in Table 6b. The speed of adjustment 
is generally higher where the German as opposed to US price plays the role of 
external price.  
 
This sector could be vulnerable under an environmental tax regime in certain 
countries, namely, in the Netherlands and in Ireland, which showed clear signs of 
being price-takers of the US price. The influence of the German price in Sweden, the 
UK and also in Ireland suggests that the sector is a price-taker on the ‘EU market’. 
However if ETR were applied on an EU-wide basis, it would affect EU ‘competing’ 
countries in a consistent manner, reducing vulnerability.  
 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 
For this sector the fit is somewhat improved when the foreign price is represented by 
the German as opposed to the US price. The adjustment coefficient is also marginally 
stronger and more significant, though Germany, Finland and Sweden are poorly 
modelled by this long-run relationship in general, regardless of the foreign price used. 
Turning to the influences on the domestic output price in Table 6a, only results for 
Denmark suggest an influence from the US price, though with only 10% significance, 
while results for Ireland, the UK (quite strongly) and the Netherlands indicate that 
domestic costs dominate.  
 
In Table 6b the German price can be viewed as a proxy for the effect of the Common 
Agricultural Policy on a large share of this sector’s prices. We find here that output 
prices in Denmark and the UK respond to this ‘EU price’, having not responded to the 
US price in Table 6a. The UK and the Netherlands show domestic costs exerting a 
strong influence on their price-setting regimes. There does not appear to be broad 
vulnerability to environmental tax reform if applied at EU level therefore. The UK is 
 11
an example of the third type of outcome mentioned above, where both domestic costs 
and the foreign (German) prices are significant so that the sector is both price-taker 
with respect to European prices, and price-setter. Were further sectoral disaggregation 
of data possible it might clarify this situation. 
 
Non-metallic Mineral Products  
This sector is not highly traded and the US price, when used to represent the foreign 
price, is nowhere significant in explaining movements in the sector’s output price. In 
the UK in particular the model shows domestic costs as a determinant. If the sector 
responds to any foreign price, it is likely to respond to the German or ‘European’ 
price. This reflects the low trade shares owing to the bulky nature of the product and 
its high weight-to-value ratio.  
 
In Table 6b, where the external price is represented by the German price, the outcome 
however is an inferior fit and the German price is only significant in the Netherlands 
and to a minor extent in Finland. Domestic costs on the other hand significantly 
determine a substantial portion of this sector’s output price in all countries 
investigated. To the extent that the external price is at all significant, the fact of it 
being the German price indicates that a carbon-energy tax applied EU-wide would not 
create significant competitive disadvantage, given that the rest of the EU would face a 
similar tax.  
 
Paper and Paper Products 
In this sector we find that a better fit with revealed behaviour is shown when the 
foreign price is represented by the German price, rather than by the US price. 
Nevertheless, Sweden and Germany, and the Netherlands to a minor extent, show a 
significant impact from the US price, an impact which is large in the case of Sweden 
according to Table 6a. In Germany’s case, domestic costs also have a significant and 
more dominant impact, a pattern also prevailing in the Netherlands.  
 
Taking the German price as the foreign price in Table 6b, we find that in size terms 
and where significant, the external price dominates the influence of domestic cost. 
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This is particularly the case in Sweden where the relationship with the German price 
is stronger than with the US price, and in Denmark and the UK. This supports the 
view that this highly traded sector is a price-taker. But, with minor exceptions in 
Germany and the Netherlands where the US price is partially influential, the effect on 
competitiveness would be reduced if ETR applied across all of the EU.  
 
Wood and Wood Products 
The findings for wood and wood products also show that a better fit is generally 
obtained using the German rather than the US price. In all cases that use the German 
price the adjustment coefficient is significant, at least at the 5% level. The results for 
Sweden may be anomalous. For the other countries examined the coefficient on 
domestic costs is highly significant and greater in magnitude than that on the foreign 
currency price. This suggests a significant degree of market power on the part of firms 
and an ability to absorb at least some of the incidence of any environmental taxes. The 
fact that it is the German price rather than that of the US which provides better 
explanatory power in the equations suggests that where an environmental tax regime 
(or emissions trading regime with auctioning) is introduced on an EU-wide basis there 
would be little effect on the competitiveness of domestic output. All firms supplying 
the EU market would be affected in a consistent manner. 
  
Basic Metals 
In the basic metals sector the US price has a strong and significant influence on output 
prices except in the cases of Germany and Ireland. An even stronger external price 
effect is found when using the German price as the external price, and this sector is 
evidently a price-taker on world markets as results indicate that this sector’s pricing is 
the most responsive to both sets of external prices. Bar the case of Ireland where 
neither foreign price has an impact, the German price is a more important determinant 
of the output price and far outweighs the influence of domestic costs, which in Table 
6a are of lesser significance and in fact insignificant in the case of Sweden. The 
exceptions, where domestic costs are significant at the 1% level, are the ‘insular’ 
countries, UK and Ireland, though the magnitude of the effect of domestic costs is still 
smaller than that of the German price. This indicates that consistent application of 
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environmental tax reform across the EU could temper the effect on competitiveness. 
The adjustment coefficient suggests a relatively strong and significant stable long-run 
pattern of response across all the countries studied. 
 
7. Implications 
This analysis of price setting by the selected sectors across ETR countries produced 
plausible results with good explanatory power. Two prices were employed to 
represent the foreign or competing price, the US price and the German price. Use of 
the German price generally fitted the data better than when the US price was used. In 
the case of the Non-metallic mineral products sector, it was only the German price 
that had a significant ‘foreign’ influence on price-setting. That applied only in the 
Netherlands and to a very small extent in Finland, putting this sector at the least 
vulnerable end of the price-setting spectrum. By contrast Basic metals revealed the 
most influence from the foreign price and was more likely to be a price-taker and 
hence vulnerable under domestic cost increases that emanated from environmental tax 
reform. 
 
Importantly, the results also showed that use of the German price was in general more 
consistent with a stable long-run price-setting relationship. Information on trade with 
the EU, shown in tables 4 and 5 above, indicated the predominance of the EU as the 
source and destination for the products of the selected sectors during the period over 
which environmental tax reform was being introduced. Therefore the indications are 
that environmental tax reform introduced on an EU-wide basis (or emissions trading 
with auctioning) would have a limited effect on the competitiveness of these sectors 
because all firms supplying the EU market would be affected in a consistent manner.  
 
These time-series regression results can be employed to rank the selected sectors 
according to decreasing significance of the external price, that is, in decreasing order 
of vulnerability or, correspondingly, in increasing order of market power. Thus ranked 
the sectors are as follows, starting with the most vulnerable:  
 
1. Basic metals 
2. Paper and paper products  
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3. Wood and wood products 
4. Chemicals  
5. Food, beverages and tobacco, and  
6. Non-metallic mineral products.  
 
Basic metals were very susceptible to international trading conditions and would be 
the most affected by an energy or carbon tax. This of course is in the absence of 
mitigating or other measures, such as targeted revenue recycling, technical 
adaptations, waivers, border tax adjustments and the like, discussed in COMETR 
(2007). The sector would face a cost disadvantage compared with its trading partners 
and would not be in a position to mark up its price. At the other extreme, the Non-
metallic mineral products sector responded very closely to domestic costs (wage costs 
in this analysis) and appeared to be relatively insulated from international trading 
conditions. The study did not show the world price, proxied by the US price, to have 
any influence. Of the sectors analysed, Non-metallic mineral products would be best 
placed to absorb a cost increase such as from carbon or energy taxes, by passing on 
the tax to its (mostly domestic) customers in the form of higher product prices. 
Sectors able to make worthwhile alterations to their technology would be better 
placed still.  
 
While we have established a hierarchy of sectors in terms of their potential 
vulnerability to environmental tax reform this hierarchy only holds within a 
reasonable range of tax rates. It is always possible that in the event of a large rise in 
tax rates affecting firms’ energy prices, firms that were previously price setters might 
become price takers. However, it would take a very sizable rise in tax rates to bring 
this about. 
 
It is now possible to add the ranking of price-setting power to the criteria used at the 
outset to gauge a sector’s vulnerability under environmental tax reform. A few 
examples of combined rankings under various criteria are now shown to give a more 
comprehensive view of the relative vulnerability of sectors. It is noted that the criteria 
are what the Carbon Tust (2004) terms ‘competitiveness drivers’ in relation to the EU 
ETS. 
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 Figure 1 below illustrates the situation when unit energy costs and pricing-power are 
taken together as two criteria of vulnerability for the combined ETR countries. The 
vertical axis shows increasing energy expenditure as a share of output, and the 
horizontal axis shows increasing market power, that is, decreasing foreign price 
influence in price-setting. Vulnerability is highest in the top left-hand corner where 
the energy share is highest and price-setting ability is lowest. Vulnerability is lowest 
in the bottom right-hand corner.  
 
On these criteria, the most vulnerable sectors are Basic metals and Chemicals in the 
top left-hand of the figure. The Chemical sector has the highest energy expenditure 
share and Basic metals is the most exposed to the world price  -  it is the least able to 
pass on cost increases. 
(Figure 1) 
 
In the bottom right-hand corner of the figure are the less vulnerable sectors Food, 
beverages and tobacco and Non-metallic minerals products. Ranked in the middle in 
terms of vulnerability is the sector Wood and paper.  
 
The implications for policy are that the introduction of ETR would require most care 
to be paid to its effects on the competitiveness of Basic metals and Chemicals rather 
than to Non-metallic mineral products, and less again to Food, beverages and tobacco. 
These rankings of vulnerability apply to the combined six countries that implemented 
ETR. (Individual country rankings are given in Appendix 2)   
 
As already flagged, a major criterion for vulnerability is the sector’s scope for 
introducing economically worthwhile energy efficiency investments. Though not the 
core aim of this study, encouragement to the use and development of energy-
efficiency is a prime objective and benefit of carbon taxes, and information on 
potential technical adjustment was sought. Potential technology adjustments that were 
available to UK energy intensive sectors had been estimated by Entec, under 
procedures for the Climate Change Agreements. These adjustment potentials can be 
used here, again for illustrative purposes. Here also the sectors can be ranked, by 
scope for adjustment measured in percentage energy saving potential at positive NPV, 
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starting with those that have least scope (i.e. the most vulnerable), as shown in Table 
7. 
 
(Table 7) 
 
The sectors now ranked according to their technological potential for energy 
efficiency adjustments can be incorporated into a similar figure, Figure 2, relating to 
the UK. Alongside ranked vulnerability to price competition is shown ranked 
vulnerability with respect to scope for technological adjustment. 
(Figure 2) 
 
At the extremes, it can be seen that in the UK the Basic metals sector is again clearly 
in a relatively vulnerable position in the figure, now joined by Wood and wood 
products. Food, beverages and tobacco and the Non-metallic mineral products sectors 
are least vulnerable   -   they have some modest potential for adapting technology and 
have some price-setting power. Chemicals and Pulp and paper are in between.  
 
These examples give relative placings of sectors and their importance lies in 
demonstrating that one can rank vulnerability on relevant criteria. They thereby 
indicate where to prioritise mitigation policies to soften any impact on 
competitiveness of sectors in the event of environmental tax reform. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
Six countries EU member states introduced environmental tax reform, in the form of 
carbon taxes with revenue recycling, during the 1990s and after. The purpose of this 
paper was to highlight sectors that could be vulnerable under such reform and to 
explore the nature of their vulnerability.  Were they price-takers and, if so, on which 
markets, and were technological opportunities available that they could call on in 
order to reduce vulnerability?  Initial screening based on intensities of energy 
expenditure and other characteristics was undertaken for all sectors to select those six 
in which price-setting behaviour would be investigated. 
 
 17
A price-setting model was posited and applied in order to throw light on the market 
power of the selected sectors. The results of the analysis were significant and 
plausible. The importance of these results is that a sector’s price-setting ability and 
hence a major aspect of its relative vulnerability can be realistically assessed.  
 
Among the selected sectors, Basic metals had least market power and Non-metallic 
minerals had most. Where the foreign price was a constraint on the price setting by 
sectors, it was the German price that tended to dominate. The significance of this fact 
is that EU-wide application of environmental tax reform, by contrast with application 
by individual countries on their own, would give less cause for concern about loss of 
competitiveness. 
 
Relocation of production is a feared outcome of the introduction of environmental 
regulations. This highlights the advantages of ETR over environmental regulations for 
example, because tax revenues are available that can be used to help prevent industrial 
relocation. This is provided that the revenue recycling is designed and targeted 
carefully using correct criteria, including the market power criterion described here.   
 
The scope for sectors to make profitable adjustments to their technology also has an 
important bearing on their vulnerability. Energy-saving investment cost curves can be 
used to assess each sector’s scope for adjusting technology, thereby avoiding the 
adverse effect of the tax side of ETR. 
 
In the analysis so far it is the Basic metals sector that emerges as being vulnerable 
consistently on most criteria. This is because it is energy intensive, it is a price-taker 
on the world market and its scope for adjusting technology is relatively low. A 
mitigating factor is its high labour intensity, meaning that any labour tax reduction 
brought about as part of the ETR could be to its benefit. The Chemicals sector shows 
similar characteristics of vulnerability though its scope for costless technology 
adjustment may not have been so limited.  
 
The vulnerability of Wood and paper depends on the criteria used. Middling 
vulnerable on pricing power were Wood and wood products and Pulp and paper, the 
former being vulnerable on technology options while the latter has scope for 
 18
adjustments (these apply to the UK). The Non-metallic minerals sector along with 
Food, beverages and tobacco are the least vulnerable on these criteria. 
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Appendix 1    Econometric tests 
 
The test for a unit root is to show whether the data conform to the requirements for the 
relationship not to be spurious. Appendix Table 1 summarises the results for the price 
variables of unit root tests on levels and in first differences of the data. Evidence 
emerges that all the series are generally I(1). They are tested for unit roots and their 
order of integration using an ADF test. Thus the relationship we seek is a 
cointegrating one.  
 
A Johansen test strongly rejects the null of no cointegration of the dependent and key 
independent variables at the 5% level, that is, they tested satisfactorily. Given the 
result that a unique cointegrating relationship exists, a single equation ECM offers a 
robust alternative to the Johansen method.  Validity is conditional on the regressors 
being weakly exogenous, but we show that this condition is satisfied. (In a 
cointegrated system, if a variable does not respond to the discrepancy from the long-
run equilibrium, it is weakly exogenous, that is, the speed of adjustment parameter is 
0.) Thus the estimation can proceed in the single-equation framework. Single equation 
estimates should be reliable and a well-determined t statistic on the ECM term is 
further evidence of cointegration. Additional tests for unit roots were undertaken for 
the price variables, interest focusing on foreign prices that the regressions tested for. 
Results are shown in Appendix Table 1. 
 
(Appendix Table 1 here ) 
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Appendix 2: Ranking by unit energy costs and market power 
 
This appendix sets out the ranking by decreasing vulnerability in individual ETR 
countries by looking at energy expenditure shares of value-added alongside market 
power as measured by foreign price influence. 
 
The model results on market power were used for ranking vulnerability, though this 
should be viewed as approximate because it is not an exact method. The ranking 
method was based mainly on the significance and size of the coefficient on the 
variable Foreign Price in Table 6b, with consideration being given to Table 6a. After 
variables with significant foreign price coefficients were exhausted, those with 
significant domestic costs were used to inform the ranking. 
 
(Appendix Table 2 here) 
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Table 1: EU Countries that introduced carbon/energy tax reforms (ETR  countries) 
 
Sweden  1991 
Denmark  1995 
Netherlands 1996 
Finland  1997 
Germany  1999 
United Kingdom  2001 (announced 1999) 
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          Table 2:  Potentially vulnerable sectors selected for analysis 
  
NACE code 
Pulp, paper and board 21 
Wood and wood products 20 
Basic chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals 24 less 24.4 
Pharmaceuticals 24.4 
Non-metallic mineral products 26 
Basic metals 27 
Food and beverages 15 
Note: Cement forms a large share of non-metallic minerals. The sector Food and beverages 
were included as a comparator.   
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Table 3:  Unit energy cost in selected sectors in ETR countries, 1998, % of GVA 
 
 
 
Wood 
and 
paper 
Pharma-
ceuticals 
Basic 
Chemicals 
 
 
Non-met 
mineral 
products 
Basic 
Metals 
Food, 
beverages 
& tobacco 
Total 
Gross 
Manuf. 
Output 
Denmark 2.4 3.3 4.8 6.8 17.7 5.4 4.6 
W. Germany 7.4 19.9 27.2 15.7 56.3 7.8 6.2 
Finland 21.4 14.5 19.7 12.3 33.0 4.0 7.9 
Netherlands 4.8 24.0 32.3 11.7 29.6 4.7 7.7 
Sweden 8.6 15.2 20.4 16.2 29.4 5.8 4.6 
UK 4.4 3.8 12.4 8.8 8.5 3.5 4.9 
EU15 8.6 17.3 24.4 17.8 42.5 6.8 7.0 
        
ETR (6) 8.0 16.7 24.4 15.0 14.4 6.0 6.5 
Non ETR(6) 9.4 18.9 25.3 21.2 36.3 7.7 7.4 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics. Notes  Annual average exchange rates from Eurostat 
Ameco database were used. Basic prices are defined as the prices received by producers 
minus any taxes payable plus subsidies received as a consequence of production or sale. The 
expenditure on energy is made up of the cost in the manufacturing process in each sector of 
11 different fuel types: Coal, Coke, Lignite, Heavy Fuel Oil, Middle Distillates, Natural Gas, 
Derived Gas, Electricity, Nuclear Fuels, Crude oil and Steam.    
:
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Table 4: Proportion of exports to EU destinations (average 1990-1998) 
 
 
Wood 
and 
Paper 
Pharma-
ceuticals 
Basic 
Chemical 
Non-met 
mineral 
products 
Basic 
Metals 
Food, 
Beverages 
& 
Tobacco 
Total 
Gross 
Manuf. 
Denmark 0.89 0.55 0.54 0.84 0.92 0.70 0.69 
W. Germany 0.78 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.69 0.73 0.63 
Finland 0.75 0.47 0.46 0.64 0.80 0.39 0.64 
Netherlands 1.84 0.67 0.66 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.73 
Sweden 0.91 0.81 0.80 0.93 0.87 0.64 0.76 
UK 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.56 0.68 0.62 0.64 
        
EU15 0.81 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.75 0.78 0.68 
Note: Data recording in the case of pulp and paper for the Netherlands is unreliable. 
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Table 5: Imports from EU as a share of country imports (average 1990-1998) 
 
 
Wood 
and 
Paper 
Pharma- 
ceuticals 
Basic 
Chemical 
Non-met 
mineral 
products 
Basic 
Metals 
Food, 
Beverages 
& 
Tobacco 
Total 
Gross 
Manuf. 
Denmark 1.02 0.89 0.89 0.95 0.94 0.68 0.77 
W. Germany 0.84 0.78 0.78 0.69 0.66 0.79 0.66 
Finland 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.68 0.67 0.81 0.70 
Netherlands 0.89 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.69 
Sweden 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.75 0.83 0.75 
UK 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.64 0.68 0.76 0.67 
        
EU15 0.90 0.86 0.86 0.70 0.73 0.81 0.74 
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Table 6a: Modelling the domestic output price  -  with the US price representing the foreign price 1  
-Adjustment speed λ 
-Domestic cost 
-Foreign price 
-Fit: Adjusted R2
 
Chemicals 
 
Food, Beverages 
and Tobacco 
 
Non-metallic 
Mineral 
Products 
 
Paper and Paper 
Products 
 
Wood and Wood 
Products 
 
Basic Metals 
Denmark      -0.128*** 
0.043 
0.137 
0.262 
 -0.050** 
0.164 
 0.295* 
0.388 
0.009 
1.377 
-0.920 
0.540 
-0.028 
0.224 
0.639 
0.453 
-0.045 
0.421 
0.151 
0.359 
  -0.062** 
0.174 
     0.643*** 
0.323 
Germany    -0.137** 
     0.381*** 
0.174 
0.492 
 -0.012 
0.242 
0.517 
0.143 
-0.022 
0.079 
-0.327 
0.498 
-0.044*** 
 0.361*** 
   0.244*** 
0.732 
-0.030* 
0.517*** 
0.110 
0.533 
 -0.149 
 0.270 
1.246 
0.598 
Finland    -0.135** 
0.037 
0.164 
0.306 
-0.010 
0.745 
0.693 
0.449 
  -0.048** 
   0.278** 
0.056 
0.410 
  -0.107** 
 0.285* 
0.153 
0.484 
  -0.118*** 
     0.464*** 
0.029 
0.401 
  -0.116*** 
   0.375*** 
   0.301*** 
0.600 
Ireland  -0.127** 
  0.143** 
  0.280** 
  0.196 
    -0.075*** 
     0.340*** 
0.182 
0.455 
-0.041* 
 0.344* 
-0.013 
0.394 
    -0.087** 
      0.659*** 
 0.061 
0.516 
    -0.150*** 
     0.572*** 
   0.154** 
0.487 
-0.400*** 
 0.240*** 
0.017 
0.213 
Netherlands     -0.152*** 
0.005 
     0.555*** 
0.580 
  -0.091** 
 0.349*** 
0.123 
0.462 
-0.016 
0.124 
0.134 
0.395 
-0.083** 
    0.338*** 
 0.195* 
0.582 
-0.064* 
     0.684*** 
-0.069 
0.446 
  -0.083** 
0.300*** 
     0.405*** 
0.508 
Sweden -0.063 
0.092 
0.590 
0.246 
 -0.017 
 -1.078 
1.190 
0.420 
-0.002 
-8.456 
 0.027 
0.727 
 -0.045* 
0.365 
    0.604** 
0.612 
-0.034* 
0.268 
0.263 
0.482 
-0.038* 
0.410* 
  0.711** 
0.634 
UK -0.079* 
0.023 
0.050 
0.195 
 -0.053*** 
0.470*** 
 0.063 
  0.547 
    -0.035*** 
     0.352*** 
0.260 
0.730 
-0.013 
-0.332 
0.629 
0.742 
    -0.067*** 
     0.556*** 
0.089 
0.656 
-0.055*** 
0.329*** 
0.267* 
0.700 
RESULT (no. of significant  2 Domestic 3 Domestic 3 Domestic 4 Domestic 5 Domestic 5 Domestic 
price determinants in 
sector) 
2 US 1 US 0 US 3 US 1 US 5 US 
1  Using US$ exchange rates and imposing PPP.      * Significant at 10%,   ** Significant at 5%,    *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 6b: Modelling the domestic output price - with the German price representing the foreign price 2
-Adjustment speed λ 
-Domestic cost  
-Foreign price  
-Fit: Adjusted R2
 
Chemicals 
 
Food, 
Beverages and 
Tobacco 
 
Non-metallic 
Mineral 
Products 
 
Paper and 
Paper Products 
 
Wood and 
Wood Products 
 
Basic Metals 
Denmark -0.175*** 
0.007 
0.389 
0.454 
-0.122*** 
-0.134* 
1.003*** 
0.429 
-0.234*** 
 0.513*** 
0.139 
0.211 
 -0.113*** 
 0.258*** 
 0.636*** 
0.562 
-0.100*** 
0.458*** 
0.358*** 
 0.420 
 -0.156*** 
0.079* 
    0.866*** 
 0.500 
Germany .. 
 
.. 
 
..    .. .. ..
Finland -0.154*** 
0.112 
0.210 
0.670 
-0.003 
0.327 
-6.157 
0.479 
-0.315*** 
  0.419*** 
0.053** 
0.227 
 -0.063*** 
0.197 
0.501 
0.555 
  -0.069*** 
 0.365** 
0.186 
0.389 
-0.136*** 
0.194** 
 0.516*** 
0.643 
Ireland -0.156*** 
0.097 
 0.559* 
0.172 
-0.050** 
0.327 
0.069 
0.472 
-0.269*** 
  0.438*** 
-0.100 
0.117 
-0.095** 
0.429*** 
  0.500** 
0.580 
-0.072** 
   0.403*** 
0.374* 
0.535 
-0.276*** 
  0.209*** 
0.294 
0.228 
Netherlands -0.034 
1.610 
-1.874 
0.758 
-0.098*** 
0.847* 
-1.333 
0.481 
-0.177*** 
 0.406*** 
 0.412*** 
0.178 
-0.031 
0.624 
0.320 
0.833 
-0.093** 
   0.703*** 
0.065 
0.461 
-0.139*** 
0.146** 
  0.665*** 
0.605 
Sweden -0.071* 
0.082 
1.048* 
0.579 
+0.011 
3.063 
-1.113 
0.553 
-0.176* 
 0.716*** 
0.018 
0.257 
-0.079*** 
-0.013 
1.036*** 
0.667 
-0.029** 
-0.342 
0.806* 
0.587 
-0.124*** 
0.047 
  0.942*** 
0.830 
UK -0.113** 
-0.136 
 0.436* 
0.540 
-0.056*** 
0.306*** 
0.376** 
0.628 
-0.167** 
0.518*** 
-0.000 
0.216 
  -0.020** 
-0.167 
0.670** 
0.774 
-0.049*** 
 0.324*** 
 0.274*** 
 0.760 
-0.115*** 
 0.229*** 
 0.476*** 
0.830 
RESULT (no. of significant  0 Domestic 3 Domestic 6 Domestic 2 Domestic 5 Domestic 5 Domestic 
price determinants in 
sector) 
3 German 2 German 2 German 4 German 4 German 5 German 
2  Using DM exchange rates and imposing PPP.     * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1% level. 
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Table 7: Ranking of sectors with respect to scope for technological 
adjustment, UK 1995 (with NACE code) 
 
20+36 Wood and wood products       (least scope, most vulnerable) 
27  Basic metals 
24  Chemicals 
26  Non-metallic mineral products 
15  Food and beverages 
21  Pulp, paper and paper products  (most scope, least vulnerable) 
 
Source: Entec/Cambridge Econometrics, 2003 
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Appendix Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
 Level  First Differences 
 ADF test statistic ADF test statistic 
LDEbasmetpr -3.315497 -5.986174*** 
LDKbasmetpr -2.689924* -8.359629*** 
LFIbasmetpr -1.568949 -6.104499*** 
LIEbasmetpr -0.343549 -5.547648*** 
LNLbasmetpr -2.598586* -6.701238*** 
LSWbasmetpr -1.871067 -5.493550*** 
LUKbasmetpr -3.237086** -4.188560*** 
LUSbasmetpr -3.189334** -3.401767*** 
LDEchempr -1.330966 -4.915669*** 
LDKchempr -2.962546** -7.000909*** 
LFIchempr -2.212823 -6.790495*** 
LIEchempr -3.452354*** -6.803949*** 
LNLchempr -3.159378** -5.440110*** 
LSWchempr -1.996497 -6.833328*** 
LUKchempr -3.897648*** -7.34932*** 
LUSchempr -0.439414 -5.204615*** 
LDEfbtpr -1.855558 -5.190388*** 
LDKfbtpr -4.054082*** -7.484247*** 
LFIfbtpr -4.326288*** -3.774157*** 
LIEfbtpr -4.104027*** -2.838678** 
LNLfbtpr -1.469798 -4.694399*** 
LSWfbtpr -3.247706** -2.765823* 
LUKfbtpr -4.929782*** -2.587562* 
LUSfbtpr -2.012392 -4.839287*** 
LDEnmetpr -1.954511 -2.406641 
LDKnmetpr -3.013959** -1.791162 
LFInmetpr -6.842790*** -4.144532*** 
LIEnmetpr -6.652777*** -2.941475** 
LNLnmetpr -2.355987 -2.109424 
LSWnmetpr -3.669447*** -2.504838* 
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LUKnmetpr -5.059891*** -2.759671** 
LUSnmetpr -1.992435 -1.908696 
LDEpappr -2.093627 -5.394902*** 
LDKpappr -2.953416** -3.220020*** 
LFIpappr -2.021902 -5.405187*** 
LIEpappr -3.470909** -5.316844*** 
LNLpappr -1.118458 -4.005505*** 
LSWpappr -1.641998 -4.828684*** 
LUKpappr -4.850024*** -4.230459*** 
LUSpappr -2.462221 -4.873529*** 
LDEwoodpr -3.409769** -2.037768 
LDKwoodpr  -3.083240*** 
LFIwoodpr -3.095870** -5.883673*** 
LIEwoodpr -4.413811*** -5.580623*** 
LNLwoodpr -2.435048* -3.394687** 
LSWwoodpr -3.588209*** -4.895384*** 
LUSwoodpr -2.135125 -3.561840*** 
LUKwoodpr -4.660079*** -3.139922** 
 
Critical values:  1% level = -3.48655;   5% level = -2.886074;   10% level = -
2.579931. 
Note: ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for unit roots. The null 
hypothesis that the series is not stationery is rejected if the test statistic exceeds 
the critical value in absolute terms. The lag length is based on the Schwarz 
Information Criterion. 
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 Appendix Table 2 Ranking of vulnerability 
 
DENMARK: (the most vulnerable sectors are at the top of each column) 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic metals Food beverages and tobacco 
Non-metallic mineral products Basic metals 
Food beverages and tobacco Paper  
Wood + Paper Non-metallic minerals 
Note: Wood and wood products and Chemicals are not well-modelled and are 
therefore omitted. In the expenditure shares Wood is included with Paper. 
 
 
WEST GERMANY: 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic chemicals  Paper 
Pharmaceuticals Chemicals 
Wood + Paper Wood 
Note: The shaded sectors are those where the issue of different classification 
between the two columns arises. Where the sectors are contiguous consistency 
can be maintained by amalgamation. 
 
 
FINLAND: 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic metals Basic metals 
Wood + Paper Non-metallic mineral products 
Non-metallic mineral products Wood 
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NETHERLANDS 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic chemicals Basic metals 
Basic metals Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals Non-metallic mineral products 
Non-metallic minerals Paper  
Wood + Paper Food beverages and tobacco 
Food beverages and tobacco  Wood 
 
 
SWEDEN 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic metals  Paper 
Basic chemicals Basic metals  
Non-metallic mineral products Chemicals 
Pharmaceuticals Wood  
Wood + Paper Non-metallic mineral products 
 
 
UK 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic chemicals  Basic metals  
Non-metallic mineral products  Paper  
Basic metals  Wood 
Wood + Paper  Chemicals  
Pharmaceuticals Food beverages and tobacco  
Food beverages and tobacco  Non-metallic mineral products  
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EU-ETR 
 
Expenditure shares Foreign price influence 
Basic chemicals 1 Basic metals 1 
Pharmaceuticals “  Paper 2 
Non-metallic mineral products 2 Wood “ 
Basic metals 3 Chemicals 3 
Wood + Paper 4 Food beverages and tobacco 4 
Food beverages and tobacco 5 Non-metallic mineral products 5 
 
It is the ranking from this last table that is used for the energy/pricing power 
vulnerability figure in the main text. 
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Figure 1: Vulnerability with respect to energy expenditure shares and 
pricing power, ETR countries combined  
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Figure 2: Vulnerability with respect to scope for technology adjustments 
and pricing power, UK  
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